Debt Dynamics

Robert Reich at Google

Robert Reich on his new book After Shock

Nepal can expand external debt?

The debt reduction has created fiscal space, but in the short run maintaining the peg calls for containing domestic borrowing close to current levels. With external debt within thresholds, the debt sustainability analysis indicates that Nepal is at moderate risk of debt distress (see Annex 1). This fiscal room could be used for building infrastructure and human capital, and for the peace process, provided spending quality is ensured. But, in the short term the worsening external position requires that domestically financed deficits remain close to current levels, while the overall deficit could be expanded provided it is funded with external grants or concessional debt. The main considerations in determining the appropriate fiscal stance are;

Debt level target. Nepal’s external debt, with an NPV of debt-to-GDP ratio of 21¾ percent, and an NPV of debt-to-exports-and remittances ratio of 63 percent, is well within DSA thresholds. Nepal’s public debt is well below the average of comparators. However, contingent liabilities of some 2–3 percent of GDP arising from the required recapitalization of state-owned banks, and potential additional liabilities stemming from the weak financial sector suggest that adequate cushions be maintained. In sum, a public debt target of around 40 percent would be appropriate to anchor fiscal policy. To stabilize the public debt-to-GDP ratio in the long run at this level, the overall deficit could rise to 3½ percent of GDP, and the domestically financed deficit would be in the range of 2¼–2½ percent of GDP, higher than in previous years.

Support for the peg and demand management. The expected slowdown in output growth would suggest a more expansionary fiscal stance in the short term. However, inflationary pressures remain high, and the peg to the Indian rupee requires that domestically financed deficits remain contained.

Crowding out and borrowing costs. A high money-to-GDP ratio suggests that, in the longer run, a somewhat higher domestic debt burden can be accommodated. However, in the short run, the expected slowdown in money growth due to the deteriorating external position, public sector borrowing may need to be contained to leave sufficient room for private credit and control interest costs

Source: Nepal: 2010 Article IV Consultation and Request for Disbursement Under the Rapid Credit Facility - Staff Report

Government Debt in Europe

When Fiscal Adjustment is not enough

The mission and the authorities agreed that fiscal adjustment alone will not
ensure debt sustainability (MEFP, paragraph 10). It was recognized that attempts to achieve higher primary fiscal targets over the medium term would not be sustainable unless accompanied by a meaningful reduction in the public debt service burden, which will require burden sharing by all stakeholders. In this context, the authorities have retained debt and legal advisors, publicly announced to seek a comprehensive and substantive restructuring of the public debt, initiated discussions with creditors, and obtained financing assurances from the Paris Club. The authorities’ strategy (Box 4), developed with the assistance of their debt advisors, emphasizes dialogue with all creditors and information transparency (including publishing relevant information on the debt restructuring on their website).

- St. Kitts and Nevis: 2011 Article IV Consultation and Request for Stand-By Arrangement - Staff Report

Mongolians can learn from the Dutch

The story of the Netherlands is of relevance to Mongolia. How does a democracy with good institutions deal with the sudden discovery of mineral wealth? Initially, the Dutch followed a path which would later become known as the Dutch Disease: a strongly appreciating currency made the non-mineral sector uncompetitive, further aggravated by highly inflationary and unproductive government spending on wages and social transfers. Undoing the negative effects of the wage spiral and the overly generous social welfare system was painful and took more than a decade. The cure for the Dutch Disease was based on a voluntary, negotiated agreement between the same stakeholders which had been responsible for the Dutch Disease—government, labor and business. It was centered on conservative fiscal policies, including low public debt, and wage restraint. The essence of this agreement formed the basis of the subsequently highly successful Polder Model—a framework which also held up very well during the 2008 global financial crisis.

Mongolia has laid a strong legal foundation for a similar macroeconomic and fiscal framework in the three rules which form the basis of the Fiscal Stability Law passed with overwhelming majority in parliament in June 2010. The three rules put strict limits and ceilings on the fiscal deficit, expenditure increases and public debt. However, the essence of the FSL only kicks in 2013, when a structural fiscal deficit of no more than 2 percent of GDP needs to be adhered to. In the transition period, Mongolia would do well to heed the lessons from Holland: curing the Dutch Disease can be long and painful. Preventing the Dutch Disease to afflict the economy in the first place would be the wiser path to take, and, if the story of the Polder Model holds true, will also reward the politicians associated with this path.

See the Annex to Mongolia Quarterly Economic Update - August 2011

Book Recommendations for Public Finance Practitioners

Chipping Away at Public Debt—Sources of Failure and Keys to Success in Fiscal Adjustment

Economic Policy-Theory and Practice Agnès Bénassy-Quéré, Benoît Coeuré, Pierre Jacquet and Jean Pisani-Ferry
Government versus Markets
The Changing Economic Role of the StateVito Tanzi

Chart of the Day- Interest Rate Spreads

The incentives for governments to stay current on what they owe are hard to measure, but financial market indicators provide a way to gauge investors’ perceptions of the willingness to repay debt. International investors became reluctant to lend to the troubled European governments, especially Greece, as indicated by interest rates on government borrowing. In particular, interest rate spreads for these countries’ debt relative to safer German issuance rose dramatically. Chart 3 shows 10-year bond spreads—the difference between the interest rate on each country’s 10-year bond minus the rate on Germany’s relatively safe 10-year obligations. Movements in these spreads in recent months show that international investors required a much higher rate of return to buy each country’s debt.

Suppose investors can buy a German bond at an annual interest rate of 4 percent with practically no risk, or a Greek bond that has a 3 percent chance of default. Investors will go with the German bond unless the Greek government offers an interest rate around 7 percent—a spread of about 3 percent—to cover the probability of default. Such a relationship can’t be expected to hold exactly in the data, but interest rate spreads can still be used to learn about the likelihood of default.[2] Chart 3 shows that in May 2010, investors’ perceived risk of default increased drastically for Greece and rose by a lesser degree for the other four countries

Assorted on Greece

Europe and IMF Agree €110 Billion Financing Plan With Greece

Prime Minister’s speech;

Our first concern was to regain credibility with our citizens. We have been honest from the very first moment with the Greek people.

Huge National Debts Could Push Euro Zone into Bankruptcy

When did Greek economic policy turn bad?

Key Links for the Greek Financing Package

Media on Macroeconomic Management

In Ten Trillion and Counting, FRONTLINE traces the politics behind this mounting debt and investigates what some say is a looming crisis that makes the current financial situation pale in comparison.


The other documentary that came out last year

I.O.U.S.A.