Showing posts with label Financial Crisis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Financial Crisis. Show all posts

Friday, December 2, 2011

Why IMF did nothing when Russia defaulted

We hear relatively little about the struggles between “area” departments, which tend to be relatively sympathetic to the countries they oversee, and “functional” departments such as those responsible for monetary and fiscal policies, which tend to be more critical. Certain departments within the IMF are notorious for being more or less open to new ideas; one functional department during the period in question was informally referred to, less than fondly, as the thought police. Again, this is something about which one would wish to learn more.­...
The book turns next to the Mexican, Russian, and Asian crises. Although these episodes have been extensively analyzed, Boughton offers a few revelations. We are told, for example, how the IMF first learned of the peso’s impending devaluation not from the Mexican government but through an offhand remark by a high-ranking U.S. official. We learn that the reason the IMF did not do more to discourage Russia from defaulting was because of a telephonic miscommunication between Camdessus, on summer vacation in Bayonne, France, and the Fund’s man in Moscow, John Odling-Smee.­
At points the drama is compelling. One cannot help but be impressed by the number of emergency phone calls at 2:00 a.m., and by how frantically IMF officials shuttled to Moscow and Jakarta to keep the world economy from falling off a cliff.­
Boughton describes just how close the world came in 1995, in 1997, and again in 1998 to a “Lehman Brothers moment.” In retrospect it is clear that, already in the 1990s, something was dreadfully wrong with a global financial system that was so vulnerable to collapse. One wonders why the IMF did not do more at the time to rectify the problem.­
See the full review of the book by Eichengreen.

Thursday, November 10, 2011

Movies about the Financial Crisis

 

There are three ways to make a living in this business. Be first, be smarter, or cheat.

Wednesday, November 9, 2011

The Economics of Good and Evil

Economics of Good and Evil-The Quest for Economic Meaning from Gilgamesh to Wall StreetTomas Sedlacek
There’s a song that says that rules and laws are created by lawyers and poets. Poets (in the wider meaning of the term) give rules meaning and spirit; lawyers give them form and letter. Similarly, we may say that a great economist can be either an outstanding mathematician or an excellent philosopher. It appears to me that we have given lawyers and mathematicians too large a role at the expense of poets and philosophers. We have exchanged too much wisdom for exactness, too much humanity for mathematization.
-Sedlacek, Tomas; Havel, Vaclav; Havel, Václav (2011-06-03). Economics of Good and Evil : The Quest for Economic Meaning from Gilgamesh to Wall Street (Kindle Locations 5420-5422). Oxford University Press, USA. Kindle Edition.

Think the quality of writing needs much improvement. 

Friday, October 7, 2011

Elizabeth Warren talk

The previous fall, Geithner huddled with top aides to develop what one called an “Elizabeth Warren strategy,” a plan to engage with the firebrand reformer that would render her politically inert. He never worked out a viable strategy—a way to meet with Warren without drawing undesirable comparisons—and so, like the president, he didn’t.
-Suskind, Ron (2011-09-20). Confidence Men: Wall Street, Washington, and the Education of a President (pp. 4-5). Harper. Kindle Edition. Related: Consumer Finance Protection Bureau

Sunday, September 18, 2011

Friday, August 26, 2011

'Economics is a set of problems in need of solution'

A highly recommended column from John Kay;
The two branches of economics most relevant to the recent crisis are macroeconomics and financial economics. Macroeconomics deals with growth and business cycles. Its dominant paradigm is known as “dynamic stochastic general equilibrium” (thankfully abbreviated to DSGE) – a complex model structure that seeks to incorporate, in a single framework, time, risk and the need to take account of the behaviour of many different companies and households...

As late as 2007, the International Monetary Fund would justify its optimism about the macroeconomic outlook with the claim that “developments in the global financial system have played an important role, including the ability of the United States to generate assets with attractive liquidity and risk management features”...

In his presidential lecture to the American Economic Association in 2003, Robert Lucas of the University of Chicago, the Nobel prizewinning doyen of modern macroeconomics, claimed that “macroeconomics has succeeded: its central problem of depression prevention has been solved”. Prof Lucas based his assertion on the institutional innovations noted by Mr Greenspan and the IMF authors, and the deeper theoretical insights that he and his colleagues claimed to have derived from models based on DSGE and the capital asset pricing model....

Subsequent policy decisions have been pragmatic and owe little to any economic theory. The recent economic policy debate strikingly replays that after 1929. The central issue is budgetary austerity versus fiscal stimulus, and – as in the 1930s – the positions of the protagonists are entirely predictable from their political allegiances.

Why did the theories put forward to deal with these issues prove so misleading? The academic debate on austerity versus stimulus centres around a property observed in models based on the DSGE programme. If government engages in fiscal stimulus by spending more or by reducing taxes, people will recognise that such a policy means higher taxes or lower spending in the future. Even if they seem to be better off today, they will later be poorer, and by a similar amount. Anticipating this, they will cut back and government spending will crowd out private spending. This property – sometimes called Ricardian equivalence – implies that fiscal policy is ineffective as a means of responding to economic dislocation...

Consistency and rigour are features of a deductive approach, which draws conclusions from a group of axioms – and whose empirical relevance depends entirely on the universal validity of the axioms. The only descriptions that fully meet the requirements of consistency and rigour are completely artificial worlds, such as the “plug-and-play” environments of DSGE – or the Grand Theft Auto computer game...

What is absurd is not the use of the deductive method but the claim to exclusivity made for it. This debate is not simply about mathematics versus poetry. Deductive reasoning necessarily draws on mathematics and formal logic: inductive reasoning, based on experience and above all careful observation, will often make use of statistics and mathematics...

Economics is not a technique in search of problems but a set of problems in need of solution. Such problems are varied and the solutions will inevitably be eclectic. Such pragmatic thinking requires not just deductive logic but an understanding of the processes of belief formation, of anthropology, psychology and organisational behaviour, and meticulous observation of what people, businesses and governments do.

Related:
How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?

Lucas- Noble Prize Lecture

In Defense of the Hedgehogs

Wednesday, December 8, 2010

Don't Cry for Greece

Argentina's experience vividly illustrates the economic damage stemming from default and departure from a hard-peg currency regime. In hindsight, the IMF has recognized that it was too optimistic about Argentina's prospects. The lesson is that postponing an unavoidable debt restructuring increases the ultimate costs, and that orderly restructuring is far preferable to the chaos of unilateral default under extreme duress (see IMF 2003).

While the Greek and Argentine episodes have in common some fiscal and monetary features, they differ importantly in their exchange rate regimes. Argentina's currency board exposed the country to balance sheet mismatches and made it vulnerable to speculative attack. More importantly, both its decision to establish a currency board in the first place and later to abandon it were unilateral. Greece's use of the euro protects it from speculative attack. Moreover, its currency regime is a result of a multilateral agreement involving continental Europe's dominant economic powers. As a member of the euro area, Greece is part of an important and influential "family." It gains a measure of protection by being under the monetary authority of the European Central Bank, one of whose primary objectives is the maintenance of stability in the euro area. As recent developments show, disorder in one country can undermine the financial stability of the whole euro area, giving member countries strong incentive to back each other up. As part of the European Monetary Union, Greece gains powerful supporters that it would lose if it were to go it alone. The magnitude of Greece's debt problem is very great and is not likely to normalize quickly. So these relationships may be tested in a few years when Greece's financial assistance package is depleted.

Chart of the Day- Interest Rate Spreads


The incentives for governments to stay current on what they owe are hard to measure, but financial market indicators provide a way to gauge investors’ perceptions of the willingness to repay debt. International investors became reluctant to lend to the troubled European governments, especially Greece, as indicated by interest rates on government borrowing. In particular, interest rate spreads for these countries’ debt relative to safer German issuance rose dramatically. Chart 3 shows 10-year bond spreads—the difference between the interest rate on each country’s 10-year bond minus the rate on Germany’s relatively safe 10-year obligations. Movements in these spreads in recent months show that international investors required a much higher rate of return to buy each country’s debt.

Suppose investors can buy a German bond at an annual interest rate of 4 percent with practically no risk, or a Greek bond that has a 3 percent chance of default. Investors will go with the German bond unless the Greek government offers an interest rate around 7 percent—a spread of about 3 percent—to cover the probability of default. Such a relationship can’t be expected to hold exactly in the data, but interest rate spreads can still be used to learn about the likelihood of default.[2] Chart 3 shows that in May 2010, investors’ perceived risk of default increased drastically for Greece and rose by a lesser degree for the other four countries

Tuesday, August 31, 2010

Friday, September 25, 2009

The Great Depression Surge of September 2008


via Google Trends

For Discussion: What's the reason for the search surge in the latter half of 2008.

Friday, May 1, 2009

Friday, April 24, 2009

Lords of Finance

Ahamed Advises Central Bankers to Be Imaginative
April 20 (Bloomberg) -- Liaquat Ahamed, chief investment officer at Charter Atlantic Corp. talks with Bloomberg's Tom Keene about his book, ``Lords of Finance: The Bankers Who Broke the World,'' and central banks' monetary policies.

Friday, April 3, 2009

Podcast of the Day- Mohammed El-Erian

Pimco's El-Erian Says to Take Investment Risk Incrementally ;
“This is not the time for a pedal-to-the-metal approach to investing,” he said in an interview on Bloomberg Radio today. “We are going toward a highly derisked and slimmed-down financial system, which means there will be less credit available for the economy as a whole.”

El-Erian, 50, said he expects more government regulation, less available credit and an “age of thrift” for the world.

“There will be a lot more caution,” El-Erian said.



Related;
'Setback for All' if Financial Turmoil Slows Globalization

When Markets Collide: Investment Strategies for the Age of Global Economic Change


Discussion on the book at Foray TV


Dealing with Global Fluidity

Demystifying the Hype


A Crisis to Remember

Essential task for G20 leaders is a cinema trip to see 'A Beautiful Mind'
Mohamed A El-Erian and Mike Spence

Thursday, April 2, 2009