Showing posts with label Monetary Policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Monetary Policy. Show all posts

Sunday, September 18, 2011

Target what you can hit

The analytical chapters of the WEO is out. The 3rd chapter address the following questions;
-What are the effects of international commodity price swings on inflation across a variety of economies? What economic factors influence these effects?
-What is the appropriate monetary policy response to commodity price shocks? In particular, how does the approach of targeting underlying inflation rather than headline inflation perform in terms of delivering macroeconomic stability in different types of economies? Should central banks respond to persistent commodity price shocks any differently than to one-time shocks?
-Finally, what are the implications for monetary policy in today’s environment, with excess demand pressures in some emerging and developing economies and economic slack in advanced economies?
These are the main findings of the chapter:
-Food price shocks tend to have larger effects on headline inflation in emerging and developing economies than in advanced economies. On a related note, because medium-term inflation expectations are weakly anchored in many emerging and developing economies, food price shocks have larger effects on inflation expectations in these economies.
-The measure of inflation used to define a central bank’s target matters because of its effect on the central bank’s credibility. In economies with low initial monetary policy credibility and high food shares in the consumption basket, focusing on underlying inflation—that is, a measure that reflects the changes in inflation that are likely to be sustained over the medium term—rather than on headline inflation, makes it easier to build credibility. The reason is that it is harder to hit headline inflation targets when commodity prices are volatile. Higher credibility, in turn, leads to better-anchored inflation expectations and lower volatility of both output and headline inflation.
-The desirability of setting and communicating monetary policy based on a measure of underlying inflation depends on the relative importance of headline inflation and output to a country’s welfare. A headline framework can lower the volatility of headline inflation, but at the cost of significantly higher volatility in output (and hence in household income).
-Finally, in economies where central bank credibility is still limited and the share of food in consumption is high (as in a number of emerging and developing economies), a food price shock is likely to have even larger second-round effects and require a more aggressive policy response when excess demand pressures are high and inflation is running above target. This assumes that the economic costs rise as the gap increases between actual inflation and the target. In contrast, in economies where the central bank’s credibility is strong, where food accounts for a low share in consumption baskets, and where there is substantial economic slack (as in major advanced economies today), the monetary policy tightening required to stabilize inflation is more gradual.

Saturday, August 27, 2011

Doing Economic Theory in Practice

A book that Olivier Blanchard wishes he had written should be a must read for economic policy students;

To give a sense of what they do, I shall take one example, the creation or reform of fiscal frameworks like the European Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). To come to an intelligent set of recommendations, think of all the elements you need to put together:

•You need to understand what sustainability means in theory and in practice, what the costs of not abiding by it are, and how to assess it. When does a debt-to-GDP ratio become truly excessive? What happens then? How fast can you reach that threshold? How fast can you move away from it?
•You need to understand the long-term effects of deficits and debt on output and its composition. How do deficits and debt affect output in the medium and the long run? How do they affect the interest rate, the net foreign debt position, the capital stock? What is the cost in terms of lost consumption in the future? Which generations gain, which generations lose?
•You need to understand the short-term effects of deficits, and how counter-cyclical fiscal policy can help in the short run. Do deficits affect activity in the same way, whether they come from tax cuts or spending increases? How important are expectation effects? Can the anticipation of large deficits in the future lead to a decrease in consumption and investment, and a decrease in output today? When is this more likely to happen?
•You need to understand the macroeconomic costs of decreased policy flexibility. Are constraints on deficits and debt consistent with an appropriate response of fiscal policy to shocks? What explains sustained divergences within the euro area during the first ten years? Were such divergences avoidable? Then you should determine whether and to what extent fiscal policy is the right tool to deal with country-specific shocks and to what extent it can (should) substitute for the lack of an independent monetary policy. Finally, you need to figure out how much policy space is left to governments after they have fought the great recession and rescued their banks.
•You need to think about how to define the rules in practice. How should debt be defined? How should implicit liabilities, coming from social security and other promises to future generations, be treated? If rules are defined in terms of deficits and debt, what are the most appropriate definitions of the two concepts for the question at hand? How should rules deal with privatization revenues? Should rules apply to gross debt or to net debt? Should the budget be separated between a current account and a capital account? Should the deficit rules apply only to the government current account? Can rules be enforced by politicians or do we need to set up independent committees?
•You need to think about political economy issues. Why are rules needed in the first place? To protect people from their governments, or to protect the governments from themselves? How can a particular set of rules be manipulated or distorted by a national government? How will sanctions against a misbehaving government be imposed? Will these sanctions be credible ex ante? Is international coordination, such as in the G-20 framework, an asset or a diversion from every government’s duties?

To answer these questions, you need many conceptual tools. Among them: a dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations; a model of short-run fluctuations with careful treatment of expectations; political economy models to think about the case for rules; agency models to help you think about the design of specific rules. In each case, with the guidance of theory, you need to look at the evidence, so as to get a sense of which theoretical arguments are more relevant. This is not easy to do. Courses will typically give you the theoretical tools, without much motivation, and let you use them on your own, without much practical training. This is not what this book does. It motivates the use of the tools, gives you the tools, and shows you how they can be used.

Wednesday, August 10, 2011

IMF's Koshy Mathai on Sri Lankan economy


We firmly believe that Sri Lanka’s flexible exchange-rate regime is appropriate and that there should be no peg. Of course, a central bank can never be totally hands off – it’s sensible to intervene in order to avoid disorderly movements in the exchange rate that could harm the economy. But econo­mists generally would say that sustained intervention in one direction or the other to keep exchange rates either above or below the levels suggested by fundamentals should be avoided.

Soon after the end of the war, we saw a long period when the rupee was virtually fixed against the dollar. Since then, we’ve seen some flexibility in one direction, with the rupee appreciating. And given the amount of foreign currency flowing into the economy, there’s little wonder that we should have seen stable or appreciating exchange rates over this period.

Going forward though, rising imports and high oil prices could imply smaller balance-of-payments surpluses or even deficits; and in such a scenario, it would be important to illustrate to markets that the rupee is flexible in both directions. This would also encourage the development of forward markets in foreign exchange and discourage short-term, speculative capital inflows, which Sri Lanka doesn’t need.

As for where the rupee should be headed in the medium term, let me just say that I learned a long time ago not to try to predict currency movements! Economists have statistical models that try to explain the appropriate levels for exchange rates, but the results of those models are sometimes difficult to assess, particularly in a world of large capital flows. In the IMF programme here, in Sri Lanka, rather than looking at the price side of things – that is, the exchange rate – we have focused on the quantity side (i.e. the level of reserves at the Central Bank).
Reserves are certainly not a problem for Sri Lanka. In fact, the build-up of reserves over the past two years has been a resounding success, far in excess of what we initially expected – and that’s not just because of foreign borrowings. Nonetheless, reserves are not high compared to levels seen in many other EMEs, and there is probably some scope for at least modest further accumulation. So in the programme, the Central Bank commits to achieving such accumulation and the exchange rate is allowed to adjust however it needs to, in support of that reserves targe

Thursday, November 12, 2009

The Debate on the International Monetary System


Keynes’ original proposal envisaged a global bank (the International Clearing Union or ICU), which would issue its own currency (bancor), based on the value of 30 representative commodities including gold, exchangeable against national currencies at fixed rates. All trade accounts would be measured in bancor, while each country would maintain a bancor account vis-à-vis the ICU (expected to be balanced within a small margin), and also have an overdraft allowance vis-à-vis the ICU. When countries experienced large trade deficits (more than half of the bancor overdraft allowance), they would pay interest on their accounts, undergo economic adjustments (possibly also capital controls) and devalue their currencies. Conversely, countries with large trade surpluses would also be subject to a similar charge and required to appreciate their exchange rates. This mechanism would bring in a smooth symmetry of adjustments across countries and avoid global imbalances.


Interesting new staff position paper from the Fund.

Friday, April 24, 2009

Lords of Finance

Ahamed Advises Central Bankers to Be Imaginative
April 20 (Bloomberg) -- Liaquat Ahamed, chief investment officer at Charter Atlantic Corp. talks with Bloomberg's Tom Keene about his book, ``Lords of Finance: The Bankers Who Broke the World,'' and central banks' monetary policies.