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Christine Lagarde's 4 Rs

A recent speech of IMF's Lagarde;

But before talking about solutions, we need to be clear about the problems. I would isolate three distinct, albeit related, issues—balance sheet pressures sapping growth, instability in the core of the global economic system, and social tensions.... I want to propose today four key policy dimensions needed to secure recovery and economic stability—repair, rebalance, reform, rebuild, the “4 R’s”.

First, repair. Before anything else, we must relieve some of the balance sheet pressures that risk smothering the recovery—on sovereigns, on households, on banks.

On sovereigns, advanced countries need credible medium-term plans to stabilize and lower public debt ratios. This must come first. But consolidating too quickly can hurt the recovery and worsen job prospects. So the challenge is to navigate between the twin perils of losing credibility and undermining growth. There is a way to do this. Credible measures that deliver and anchor savings in the medium term will help create space for accommodating growth today—by allowing a slower pace of consolidation.

Of course, the precise path is different for each country. Some have no choice but to cut deficits today, especially if they are under market pressure. Others should stick to their adjustment plans, but be ready to change course if growth falters further. Others still are probably pushing too hard today, and could slow down a bit.

One more point—it’s not just the what of the adjustment, it’s the how. In the short run, policymakers must focus on measures with the biggest bang-for-the-buck, that create jobs and kick-start growth, and that take distributional considerations into account. The how of adjustment is also important in the medium term, where fiscal plans should seek to support growth. I’m thinking of issues like tax reform, including by broadening bases. Equally, entitlement reforms will be essential in establishing long-term debt sustainability in virtually all advanced economies.

Policymakers must also deal with household and bank balance sheets.

In light of the jobs crisis in the United States, I welcome President Obama’s recent proposals to address growth and employment. At the same time, it remains critical for policymakers to clarify in parallel their medium term plans to put public debt on a sustainable path. In tandem with this crucial employment agenda, it is important to relieve overburdened households through actions like more aggressive principal reduction programs, or helping homeowners take advantage of low interest rates.

In Europe, the sovereigns must address firmly their financing problems through credible fiscal consolidation. In addition, to support growth, via private sector lending, all banks must have sufficient capital buffers.

The second “R” is reform. If repair was about getting the economy moving today, reform is about laying the foundations for a more stable economic future tomorrow.

A priority here is financial sector reform. On the plus side, we have broad agreement on higher quality capital and liquidity standards with appropriate phase-in arrangements. But substantial gaps remain in areas like supervision, cross-border resolution, too-important-to-fail, and shadow banking systems. We need international cooperation across all dimensions to avoid regulatory arbitrage. The fact that so many of these issues are still unresolved three years after Lehman should be of concern to us all.

We also need to develop and fine-tune macro-prudential tools to guard against financial risks. I’m thinking here of policies like having banks hold more capital when times are good or implementing maximum loan-to-value ratios to guard against housing price bubbles.

Under the reform banner, I would also include the social dimension. Employment must be central. It not only sustains demand, but supports human dignity. In the words of Dostoevsky, “deprived of meaningful work, men and women lose their reason for existence”. This is especially important among the young, who risk losing the race even before the starting gun has sounded. We should also seek growth that is inclusive, benefiting the whole of society.

The third “R” is rebalance. This has two meanings. First, it means shifting back demand from the public to the private sector, when the private sector is strong enough to carry the load. This hasn’t happened yet.

The second rebalancing involves a global demand switch from external deficit to external surplus counties. The idea here is straightforward—with lower spending and higher savings in the advanced economies, key emerging markets must take up the slack and start providing the demand needed to power the global recovery. But any rebalancing so far is largely due to lower growth. In some countries, rebalancing is being held back by policies that keep domestic demand growth too slow and currency appreciation too modest. Some other emerging markets are dealing with dangers from capital inflows that are too rapid.

This lack of sufficient rebalancing hurts everyone. In our inter-connected world, any thought of decoupling is a mirage. If the advanced economies succumb to recession, the emerging markets will not escape. Nobody will. Rebalancing is in the global interest, but it is also in the national interest.

Woodrow Wilson would have appreciated that, I'm sure.

My fourth—and final—“R” is rebuild. Here I am thinking mainly of the low-income countries that need to rebuild their economic policy buffers—including fiscal positions—that served them so well during the crisis, to protect themselves against future storms. This will also help provide the space for growth-enhancing public investment and social safety nets—for example, allowing countries to deploy well-targeted subsidies to protect the poor from commodity price swings with minimal damage to fiscal sustainability.

Chapter 4 of WEO- The Twin Budget and Trade Balances

How do changes in taxes and government spending affect an economy’s external balance? Based on a historical analysis of documented fiscal policy changes and on model simulations, this chapter finds that the current account responds substantially to fiscal policy—a fiscal consolidation of 1 percent of GDP typically improves an economy’s current account balance by over a half percent of GDP. This comes about not only through lower imports due to a decline in domestic demand but also from a rise in exports due to a weakening currency. When the nominal exchange rate is fixed or the scope for monetary stimulus is limited, the current account adjusts by as much, but the adjustment is more painful: economic activity contracts more and the real exchange rate depreciates through domestic wage and price compression. When economies tighten fiscal policies simultaneously, what matters for the current account is how much an economy consolidates relative to others. Looking ahead, the differing magnitudes of fiscal adjustment plans across the world will help lower imbalances within the euro area and reduce emerging Asia’s external surpluses. The relative lack of permanent consolidation measures in the United States suggests that fiscal policy will contribute little to lessening the U.S. external deficit.

We find that fiscal policy has a substantial and long-lasting effect on the current account. A fiscal consolidation of 1 percent of GDP improves the current account by over a half percent of GDP within two years, with the improvement persisting into the medium term. The improvement in the current account comes not only through lower imports due to falling domestic demand, but also from an increase in exports arising from a weaker domestic currency.

See chapter 4

Target what you can hit- follow up

In case you don't have time to read the entire chapter 3 , please read the two boxes
- Box 3.1. Inflation in Sub-Saharan Africa during the 2008 Commodity Price Surge 
- Box 3.2. Food Price Swings and Monetary Policy in Open Economies

What accounts for the relative stability of nonfood inflation? As Table 3.1.4 indicates, the macroeconomic environment was broadly neutral during this period. There was a small increase in government spending. On the monetary front, there was a small increase in the growth rate of monetary aggregates; money targets were missed in eight countries for which there are data; and nominal interest rates stayed constant—all of which is broadly consistent with an accommodation of first-round effects.

Target what you can hit

The analytical chapters of the WEO is out. The 3rd chapter address the following questions;

-What are the effects of international commodity price swings on inflation across a variety of economies? What economic factors influence these effects?

-What is the appropriate monetary policy response to commodity price shocks? In particular, how does the approach of targeting underlying inflation rather than headline inflation perform in terms of delivering macroeconomic stability in different types of economies? Should central banks respond to persistent commodity price shocks any differently than to one-time shocks?

-Finally, what are the implications for monetary policy in today’s environment, with excess demand pressures in some emerging and developing economies and economic slack in advanced economies?

These are the main findings of the chapter:

-Food price shocks tend to have larger effects on headline inflation in emerging and developing economies than in advanced economies. On a related note, because medium-term inflation expectations are weakly anchored in many emerging and developing economies, food price shocks have larger effects on inflation expectations in these economies.

-The measure of inflation used to define a central bank’s target matters because of its effect on the central bank’s credibility. In economies with low initial monetary policy credibility and high food shares in the consumption basket, focusing on underlying inflation—that is, a measure that reflects the changes in inflation that are likely to be sustained over the medium term—rather than on headline inflation, makes it easier to build credibility. The reason is that it is harder to hit headline inflation targets when commodity prices are volatile. Higher credibility, in turn, leads to better-anchored inflation expectations and lower volatility of both output and headline inflation.

-The desirability of setting and communicating monetary policy based on a measure of underlying inflation depends on the relative importance of headline inflation and output to a country’s welfare. A headline framework can lower the volatility of headline inflation, but at the cost of significantly higher volatility in output (and hence in household income).

-Finally, in economies where central bank credibility is still limited and the share of food in consumption is high (as in a number of emerging and developing economies), a food price shock is likely to have even larger second-round effects and require a more aggressive policy response when excess demand pressures are high and inflation is running above target. This assumes that the economic costs rise as the gap increases between actual inflation and the target. In contrast, in economies where the central bank’s credibility is strong, where food accounts for a low share in consumption baskets, and where there is substantial economic slack (as in major advanced economies today), the monetary policy tightening required to stabilize inflation is more gradual.

Nepal can expand external debt?

The debt reduction has created fiscal space, but in the short run maintaining the peg calls for containing domestic borrowing close to current levels. With external debt within thresholds, the debt sustainability analysis indicates that Nepal is at moderate risk of debt distress (see Annex 1). This fiscal room could be used for building infrastructure and human capital, and for the peace process, provided spending quality is ensured. But, in the short term the worsening external position requires that domestically financed deficits remain close to current levels, while the overall deficit could be expanded provided it is funded with external grants or concessional debt. The main considerations in determining the appropriate fiscal stance are;

Debt level target. Nepal’s external debt, with an NPV of debt-to-GDP ratio of 21¾ percent, and an NPV of debt-to-exports-and remittances ratio of 63 percent, is well within DSA thresholds. Nepal’s public debt is well below the average of comparators. However, contingent liabilities of some 2–3 percent of GDP arising from the required recapitalization of state-owned banks, and potential additional liabilities stemming from the weak financial sector suggest that adequate cushions be maintained. In sum, a public debt target of around 40 percent would be appropriate to anchor fiscal policy. To stabilize the public debt-to-GDP ratio in the long run at this level, the overall deficit could rise to 3½ percent of GDP, and the domestically financed deficit would be in the range of 2¼–2½ percent of GDP, higher than in previous years.

Support for the peg and demand management. The expected slowdown in output growth would suggest a more expansionary fiscal stance in the short term. However, inflationary pressures remain high, and the peg to the Indian rupee requires that domestically financed deficits remain contained.

Crowding out and borrowing costs. A high money-to-GDP ratio suggests that, in the longer run, a somewhat higher domestic debt burden can be accommodated. However, in the short run, the expected slowdown in money growth due to the deteriorating external position, public sector borrowing may need to be contained to leave sufficient room for private credit and control interest costs

Source: Nepal: 2010 Article IV Consultation and Request for Disbursement Under the Rapid Credit Facility - Staff Report

Random Data- Nepal's Government Revenues

Random Data- What's Bhutan's Government Revenues

The answer is it depends. See also the latest Economic Update on Bhutan from the World Bank

Reading for the Weekend- paper by Kashik Basu on Indian Inflation

Understanding Inflation and controlling it

FRL in Mongolia - some of the Ceilings

Mongolia's FRL appears interesting;

1. The floor of structural balance is the deficit of 2 percent of GDP. The structural balance is calculated by using the moving average price of major minerals—currently copper and coal—over 16 years (past 12 years, current year, and future three years). This provision takes effect in 2013.
2. The ceiling of expenditure growth is the non-mineral GDP growth rate, determined as the greater between its 12-year moving average value and the budget year’s GDP growth rate. This provision takes effect in 2013.
3. Net present value of public debt cannot exceed 40 percent of GDP. This excludes any borrowing in which the government has agreed to contribute into the paid-in capital of a foreign invested mining entity and which is repayable from the future profits of the entity. The provision takes effect from 2014, with a transition period specified for the preceding years.

IMF's view on Mongolia's fiscal framework;

Medium-term fiscal framework. A sound fiscal policy is necessary for ensuring that Mongolia’s mineral wealth leads to lasting prosperity for all Mongolians. In practical terms, this means managing public spending growth in a way that (i) helps smooth economic growth (through a counter-cyclical fiscal policy); (ii) leaves room for the private sector to thrive; and (iii) provides buffers to insulate the budget—and the economy—against a downturn in global commodity prices. The adoption of the Fiscal Responsibility Law last year was a landmark achievement in this regard. However, the 2011 budget is a big step backwards. The Fiscal Responsibility Law will succeed only if it is strictly adhered to in letter and spirit; failure to do so will undermine its credibility and limits its effectiveness in preventing a recurrence of the policy driven, boom-bust cycles that Mongolia has experienced in the past. Compliance will entail expenditure restraint in the coming years, for example, by keeping spending
roughly frozen in real terms in order to reach the 2013 structural deficit target. Moreover, it is equally important not to circumvent the law by using off-budget vehicles or government guarantees that would, in effect, undo the economic benefits of adhering to the law and come
with the additional costs of an increase in fiscal risks and a loss of transparency. The Development Bank, public-private partnerships, and public guarantees are sources of such quasi-fiscal risk and, if such operations are to proceed, need to be managed prudently and in line with international good practices.

Related;
Strengthening the MTEF Process in Mongolia

Mongolians can learn from the Dutch

The story of the Netherlands is of relevance to Mongolia. How does a democracy with good institutions deal with the sudden discovery of mineral wealth? Initially, the Dutch followed a path which would later become known as the Dutch Disease: a strongly appreciating currency made the non-mineral sector uncompetitive, further aggravated by highly inflationary and unproductive government spending on wages and social transfers. Undoing the negative effects of the wage spiral and the overly generous social welfare system was painful and took more than a decade. The cure for the Dutch Disease was based on a voluntary, negotiated agreement between the same stakeholders which had been responsible for the Dutch Disease—government, labor and business. It was centered on conservative fiscal policies, including low public debt, and wage restraint. The essence of this agreement formed the basis of the subsequently highly successful Polder Model—a framework which also held up very well during the 2008 global financial crisis.

Mongolia has laid a strong legal foundation for a similar macroeconomic and fiscal framework in the three rules which form the basis of the Fiscal Stability Law passed with overwhelming majority in parliament in June 2010. The three rules put strict limits and ceilings on the fiscal deficit, expenditure increases and public debt. However, the essence of the FSL only kicks in 2013, when a structural fiscal deficit of no more than 2 percent of GDP needs to be adhered to. In the transition period, Mongolia would do well to heed the lessons from Holland: curing the Dutch Disease can be long and painful. Preventing the Dutch Disease to afflict the economy in the first place would be the wiser path to take, and, if the story of the Polder Model holds true, will also reward the politicians associated with this path.

See the Annex to Mongolia Quarterly Economic Update - August 2011

Mongolia - the Economy in Pictures

Mongolia Quarterly Economic Update, August 2011

Mongolia’s economic outlook depends heavily on global macroeconomic factors: the current uncertainty and poor growth prospects for the global economy are cause for concern. If there is another global recession, Mongolia’s small, open economy will be affected. In that case, China’s policy reaction will be crucial for Mongolia. If China reacts as fast and as strongly as it did in 2008/9 then the effects of a global recession on Mongolia will be mitigated, largely owing to Chinese demand for minerals from Mongolia. Beyond this, it is up to Mongolia to capitalize on its excellent long term prospects by continuing the reform agenda it embarked on during the 2008/9 crisis.

IMF's Koshy Mathai on Sri Lankan economy

We firmly believe that Sri Lanka’s flexible exchange-rate regime is appropriate and that there should be no peg. Of course, a central bank can never be totally hands off – it’s sensible to intervene in order to avoid disorderly movements in the exchange rate that could harm the economy. But econo­mists generally would say that sustained intervention in one direction or the other to keep exchange rates either above or below the levels suggested by fundamentals should be avoided.

Soon after the end of the war, we saw a long period when the rupee was virtually fixed against the dollar. Since then, we’ve seen some flexibility in one direction, with the rupee appreciating. And given the amount of foreign currency flowing into the economy, there’s little wonder that we should have seen stable or appreciating exchange rates over this period.

Going forward though, rising imports and high oil prices could imply smaller balance-of-payments surpluses or even deficits; and in such a scenario, it would be important to illustrate to markets that the rupee is flexible in both directions. This would also encourage the development of forward markets in foreign exchange and discourage short-term, speculative capital inflows, which Sri Lanka doesn’t need.

As for where the rupee should be headed in the medium term, let me just say that I learned a long time ago not to try to predict currency movements! Economists have statistical models that try to explain the appropriate levels for exchange rates, but the results of those models are sometimes difficult to assess, particularly in a world of large capital flows. In the IMF programme here, in Sri Lanka, rather than looking at the price side of things – that is, the exchange rate – we have focused on the quantity side (i.e. the level of reserves at the Central Bank).
Reserves are certainly not a problem for Sri Lanka. In fact, the build-up of reserves over the past two years has been a resounding success, far in excess of what we initially expected – and that’s not just because of foreign borrowings. Nonetheless, reserves are not high compared to levels seen in many other EMEs, and there is probably some scope for at least modest further accumulation. So in the programme, the Central Bank commits to achieving such accumulation and the exchange rate is allowed to adjust however it needs to, in support of that reserves targe

IMF to Australia- 'resist pressures to prop up declining industries'

IMF on structural reforms for Australia;

On broader structural reforms, we welcome the steps taken to invest in skills training, which should help workers improve their mobility and income prospects. Looking ahead, it is important to use the window of opportunity provided by the current favorable economic outlook to push ahead with the Council of Australian Governments’ reform agenda, including in the areas of education, infrastructure and harmonization of business regulations. In addition, the government should resist pressures to prop up declining industries

Related;
National Agreement for Skills and Workforce Development: Performance report for 2009

Fun with IMF reports

“Going forward, the authorities intend to take fiscal measures to stabilize and reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio and support the economic recovery, while maintaining price and exchange rate stability. They also plan to reform and enhance tax administration, increase fiscal responsibility, and improve transparency for public enterprises. Global developments, including high oil prices, pose risks to the outlook, but upside potential could offset these if projects under consideration materialize. The mission is confident that the determined pursuit of fiscal consolidation and an enabling investment climate will improve the macroeconomic environment and support sustained economic growth.”

Here's the country.

Seven Wisdoms on the Sri Lankan Economy

Koshy Mathai, the highly-respected and much-sought-after IMF Resident Rep in Sri Lanka left the audience with seven points of his wisdom to ponder if Sri Lanka is to sustain its current euphoric growth experience...

The IMF and its staff have a remarkable skill in using a specially articulated polite language when it comes to addressing a host country’s general public. This is understandable because the IMF is a guest in a host country and should not overtly or covertly rouse popular sentiments or add to the fears of people by speaking the wrong language and be an embarrassment to its host...

Risk factors need urgent attention
Koshy did not say it explicitly, but he implied that the achievements so far are not adequate for sustaining the growth momentum in the medium to long run. He coated it nicely saying that there are “risk factors” facing the economy and they need be addressed urgently and permanently.
In my view, his implication was that the longer Sri Lanka would delay action, the worse would be the results it will have to reap. It is like a cancer patient refusing stubbornly to take medication in time and one fine day finding the cancer invading his vital systems.
To overcome these risk factors and place the economy in a sustainable growth path, he suggested a course of action that embodied the seven points of his wisdom...

One should not forget that the IMF benchmarks are too liberal and were revised upward when it found that it was the only way to save the stand-by arrangement.
Its budget deficit at seven per cent and debt level at 80 per cent, both of GDP, are unsustainable. Therefore, in the long run, there is no alternative but to discipline the budget, as now identified by Koshy too...

In this context, according to Koshy, the Government’s recognition of the need for developing five hubs in Sri Lanka is an important step taken toward the modernisation of the country’s economy.
While all hubs will help Sri Lanka to expand its services sector and sell services to the rest of the world, the knowledge hub will develop Sri Lanka’s human capital base. The early signing of CEPA with India will help Sri Lanka to develop its knowledge base by establishing higher academic institutions in the style of reputed Indian institutes of Technology with Indian partnership.

-Want to uplift the economy? Follow the 7 wisdoms of Koshy Mathai

Belize Economic Outlook

IMF reviews Belize economy;

Key recommendations. Staff recommended a gradual increase in the primary surplus to 4½ percent of GDP, mainly through wage and pension reforms, to place the public debt on a firm downward path and reduce external financing needs. It also recommended continued actions to strengthen the financial system and welcomed improvements in the monetary policy framework. The authorities broadly agreed with the recommendations, particularly tostrengthen the banking system. They planned to seek consensus on needed fiscal reforms, but noted that, in the near term, social conditions strictly constrained the scope for fiscal consolidation.

The authorities seek to reinvigorate growth prospects and reduce the poverty
rate to 35 percent by 2013. The development plan for 2010–13 focuses on job creation and identifies sources of growth in tourism, agro-industry, and fishing. It rests on five pillars: developing small enterprises; strengthening export trade capacity; enhancing human development; addressing social dislocations and reducing crime; and managing environmental and natural disaster risk. The plan seeks to strengthen competitiveness by addressing infrastructure bottlenecks, high costs of financing, and red tape. It contains investment and social plans that will be assessed and integrated into the multiyear budget and presented to donors later this year.

Chart of the Day- The Revolution in Kenya

Kenya Economic Update

India and Kenya- IT sector comparision

There is a broad agreement that several key factors determine competitiveness in IT/BPO:(i)availability of employable skills(including IT skills), (ii) competitive costs,(iii)quality of infrastructure relevant to the IT/BPO industry,and(iv)and overall environment that is conducive to business. Of all these factors, countries can substantially increase their international competetive advantage if they execute smart strategies to increase their skills offering for the industry.

Given these developments, the lack of skills is now the most important binding constraint to the growth of the IT/BPO sector in Kenya. The country currently produces around 30,000 university graduates and about 250,000 graduates from high school annually. However, very few of these graduates, whether at school or university level, are immediately suitable for employment in the IT/BPO industry. According to the recent McKinsey Report (2008), the talent pool for the BPO sector in Kenya currently is very limited. Only about 5,000 graduates are suitable for employment in the industry. The report has projected the skills required for BPO sector to be 70 percent for voice and data operators, 5 percent for managers, 10 percent for engineers and 15 percent for technicians

Source: World Bank, Kenya Economic Update

Related:
Location Readiness Index

Bosnia and Herzegovina: Selected Issues

Bosnia and Herzegovina: Selected Issues

Contents

1. Post-Crisis Growth Prospects And Supporting Policies
2. External Sector Stability and Competitiveness
3. Cyclical Developments And Fiscal Policy Design
4. The Case for Pension Systems Reform