Target what you can hit

The analytical chapters of the WEO is out. The 3rd chapter address the following questions;

-What are the effects of international commodity price swings on inflation across a variety of economies? What economic factors influence these effects?

-What is the appropriate monetary policy response to commodity price shocks? In particular, how does the approach of targeting underlying inflation rather than headline inflation perform in terms of delivering macroeconomic stability in different types of economies? Should central banks respond to persistent commodity price shocks any differently than to one-time shocks?

-Finally, what are the implications for monetary policy in today’s environment, with excess demand pressures in some emerging and developing economies and economic slack in advanced economies?

These are the main findings of the chapter:

-Food price shocks tend to have larger effects on headline inflation in emerging and developing economies than in advanced economies. On a related note, because medium-term inflation expectations are weakly anchored in many emerging and developing economies, food price shocks have larger effects on inflation expectations in these economies.

-The measure of inflation used to define a central bank’s target matters because of its effect on the central bank’s credibility. In economies with low initial monetary policy credibility and high food shares in the consumption basket, focusing on underlying inflation—that is, a measure that reflects the changes in inflation that are likely to be sustained over the medium term—rather than on headline inflation, makes it easier to build credibility. The reason is that it is harder to hit headline inflation targets when commodity prices are volatile. Higher credibility, in turn, leads to better-anchored inflation expectations and lower volatility of both output and headline inflation.

-The desirability of setting and communicating monetary policy based on a measure of underlying inflation depends on the relative importance of headline inflation and output to a country’s welfare. A headline framework can lower the volatility of headline inflation, but at the cost of significantly higher volatility in output (and hence in household income).

-Finally, in economies where central bank credibility is still limited and the share of food in consumption is high (as in a number of emerging and developing economies), a food price shock is likely to have even larger second-round effects and require a more aggressive policy response when excess demand pressures are high and inflation is running above target. This assumes that the economic costs rise as the gap increases between actual inflation and the target. In contrast, in economies where the central bank’s credibility is strong, where food accounts for a low share in consumption baskets, and where there is substantial economic slack (as in major advanced economies today), the monetary policy tightening required to stabilize inflation is more gradual.

Nepal can expand external debt?

The debt reduction has created fiscal space, but in the short run maintaining the peg calls for containing domestic borrowing close to current levels. With external debt within thresholds, the debt sustainability analysis indicates that Nepal is at moderate risk of debt distress (see Annex 1). This fiscal room could be used for building infrastructure and human capital, and for the peace process, provided spending quality is ensured. But, in the short term the worsening external position requires that domestically financed deficits remain close to current levels, while the overall deficit could be expanded provided it is funded with external grants or concessional debt. The main considerations in determining the appropriate fiscal stance are;

Debt level target. Nepal’s external debt, with an NPV of debt-to-GDP ratio of 21¾ percent, and an NPV of debt-to-exports-and remittances ratio of 63 percent, is well within DSA thresholds. Nepal’s public debt is well below the average of comparators. However, contingent liabilities of some 2–3 percent of GDP arising from the required recapitalization of state-owned banks, and potential additional liabilities stemming from the weak financial sector suggest that adequate cushions be maintained. In sum, a public debt target of around 40 percent would be appropriate to anchor fiscal policy. To stabilize the public debt-to-GDP ratio in the long run at this level, the overall deficit could rise to 3½ percent of GDP, and the domestically financed deficit would be in the range of 2¼–2½ percent of GDP, higher than in previous years.

Support for the peg and demand management. The expected slowdown in output growth would suggest a more expansionary fiscal stance in the short term. However, inflationary pressures remain high, and the peg to the Indian rupee requires that domestically financed deficits remain contained.

Crowding out and borrowing costs. A high money-to-GDP ratio suggests that, in the longer run, a somewhat higher domestic debt burden can be accommodated. However, in the short run, the expected slowdown in money growth due to the deteriorating external position, public sector borrowing may need to be contained to leave sufficient room for private credit and control interest costs

Source: Nepal: 2010 Article IV Consultation and Request for Disbursement Under the Rapid Credit Facility - Staff Report

Random Data- Nepal's Government Revenues

Google Data Explorer is cool

Government Revenues and Expenditures

 Note to Self: IMF DataMapper users the following definitions for public revenues and expenditures.

General government revenue (National currency)
Revenue consists of taxes, social contributions, grants receivable, and other revenue. Revenue increases government’s net worth, which is the difference between its assets and liabilities (GFSM 2001, paragraph 4.20). Note: Transactions that merely change the composition of the balance sheet do not change the net worth position, for example, proceeds from sales of nonfinancial and financial assets or incurrence of liabilities.

General government total expenditure (National currency)
Total expenditure consists of total expense and the net acquisition of nonfinancial assets. Note: Apart from being on an accrual basis, total expenditure differs from the GFSM 1986 definition of total expenditure in the sense that it also takes the disposals of nonfinancial assets into account.

What's the quickest way to find public finance data on the web?

So whats the quickest way to find International Public Finance data on the web? Is it
A- Wolfram Alpha
B- World Development Indicators
C- IMF Data Mapper

Homework: Try finding the latest estimates of Bhutan's government revenues estimates?

Doing Economic Theory in Practice

A book that Olivier Blanchard wishes he had written should be a must read for economic policy students;

To give a sense of what they do, I shall take one example, the creation or reform of fiscal frameworks like the European Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). To come to an intelligent set of recommendations, think of all the elements you need to put together:

•You need to understand what sustainability means in theory and in practice, what the costs of not abiding by it are, and how to assess it. When does a debt-to-GDP ratio become truly excessive? What happens then? How fast can you reach that threshold? How fast can you move away from it?
•You need to understand the long-term effects of deficits and debt on output and its composition. How do deficits and debt affect output in the medium and the long run? How do they affect the interest rate, the net foreign debt position, the capital stock? What is the cost in terms of lost consumption in the future? Which generations gain, which generations lose?
•You need to understand the short-term effects of deficits, and how counter-cyclical fiscal policy can help in the short run. Do deficits affect activity in the same way, whether they come from tax cuts or spending increases? How important are expectation effects? Can the anticipation of large deficits in the future lead to a decrease in consumption and investment, and a decrease in output today? When is this more likely to happen?
•You need to understand the macroeconomic costs of decreased policy flexibility. Are constraints on deficits and debt consistent with an appropriate response of fiscal policy to shocks? What explains sustained divergences within the euro area during the first ten years? Were such divergences avoidable? Then you should determine whether and to what extent fiscal policy is the right tool to deal with country-specific shocks and to what extent it can (should) substitute for the lack of an independent monetary policy. Finally, you need to figure out how much policy space is left to governments after they have fought the great recession and rescued their banks.
•You need to think about how to define the rules in practice. How should debt be defined? How should implicit liabilities, coming from social security and other promises to future generations, be treated? If rules are defined in terms of deficits and debt, what are the most appropriate definitions of the two concepts for the question at hand? How should rules deal with privatization revenues? Should rules apply to gross debt or to net debt? Should the budget be separated between a current account and a capital account? Should the deficit rules apply only to the government current account? Can rules be enforced by politicians or do we need to set up independent committees?
•You need to think about political economy issues. Why are rules needed in the first place? To protect people from their governments, or to protect the governments from themselves? How can a particular set of rules be manipulated or distorted by a national government? How will sanctions against a misbehaving government be imposed? Will these sanctions be credible ex ante? Is international coordination, such as in the G-20 framework, an asset or a diversion from every government’s duties?

To answer these questions, you need many conceptual tools. Among them: a dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations; a model of short-run fluctuations with careful treatment of expectations; political economy models to think about the case for rules; agency models to help you think about the design of specific rules. In each case, with the guidance of theory, you need to look at the evidence, so as to get a sense of which theoretical arguments are more relevant. This is not easy to do. Courses will typically give you the theoretical tools, without much motivation, and let you use them on your own, without much practical training. This is not what this book does. It motivates the use of the tools, gives you the tools, and shows you how they can be used.

FRL in Mongolia - some of the Ceilings

Mongolia's FRL appears interesting;

1. The floor of structural balance is the deficit of 2 percent of GDP. The structural balance is calculated by using the moving average price of major minerals—currently copper and coal—over 16 years (past 12 years, current year, and future three years). This provision takes effect in 2013.
2. The ceiling of expenditure growth is the non-mineral GDP growth rate, determined as the greater between its 12-year moving average value and the budget year’s GDP growth rate. This provision takes effect in 2013.
3. Net present value of public debt cannot exceed 40 percent of GDP. This excludes any borrowing in which the government has agreed to contribute into the paid-in capital of a foreign invested mining entity and which is repayable from the future profits of the entity. The provision takes effect from 2014, with a transition period specified for the preceding years.

IMF's view on Mongolia's fiscal framework;

Medium-term fiscal framework. A sound fiscal policy is necessary for ensuring that Mongolia’s mineral wealth leads to lasting prosperity for all Mongolians. In practical terms, this means managing public spending growth in a way that (i) helps smooth economic growth (through a counter-cyclical fiscal policy); (ii) leaves room for the private sector to thrive; and (iii) provides buffers to insulate the budget—and the economy—against a downturn in global commodity prices. The adoption of the Fiscal Responsibility Law last year was a landmark achievement in this regard. However, the 2011 budget is a big step backwards. The Fiscal Responsibility Law will succeed only if it is strictly adhered to in letter and spirit; failure to do so will undermine its credibility and limits its effectiveness in preventing a recurrence of the policy driven, boom-bust cycles that Mongolia has experienced in the past. Compliance will entail expenditure restraint in the coming years, for example, by keeping spending
roughly frozen in real terms in order to reach the 2013 structural deficit target. Moreover, it is equally important not to circumvent the law by using off-budget vehicles or government guarantees that would, in effect, undo the economic benefits of adhering to the law and come
with the additional costs of an increase in fiscal risks and a loss of transparency. The Development Bank, public-private partnerships, and public guarantees are sources of such quasi-fiscal risk and, if such operations are to proceed, need to be managed prudently and in line with international good practices.

Related;
Strengthening the MTEF Process in Mongolia

How VAT works

Under a VAT, businesses pay tax on the value they add to the goods and services they purchase from other businesses. VAT liability is typically calculated in industrialized countries using what is known as the credit-invoice method. Under this method, businesses apply the VAT rate to their sales but claim a credit for VAT paid on purchases of inputs from other businesses (shown on purchase invoices). The difference between the VAT collected on sales and the credit for VAT paid on input purchases is remitted to the government.

Figure 1 illustrates a VAT with a 10 percent rate. A lumber company cuts and mills trees and has sales of $50 to a furniture maker. Assuming no input purchases from other businesses, to keep the illustration simple, the company adds the tax to the price of the goods sold and remits $5 in tax to the government. The purchase invoice received by the furniture maker would list $50 in purchases plus $5 in VAT paid.

If the furniture maker has sales of $120 to a retail store, $12 of VAT would be added to the sales price but the furniture maker could subtract a credit for the $5 VAT paid on purchases and remit $7 to the government. The retailer would receive an invoice showing purchases of $120 and $12 of VAT. Similarly, if the retailer then has sales of $150, $15 of VAT would be added but the retailer could subtract a credit for the $12 paid on purchases and remit $3 to the government.

In total, the government would receive VAT equal to 10 percent of the final sales price to consumers. Thus, a 10 percent VAT is equivalent to a 10 percent retail sales tax in terms of revenue. Under both taxes, the final consumer ultimately bears the economic burden of the tax ($15), except in a VAT, the tax is collected in stages, not just in the final sale.

-Value-Added Taxes: Lessons Learned from Other Countries on Compliance Risks, Administrative Costs, Compliance Burden, and Transition

Mr. Tanzi vs Mr. Taylor

An interesting interview with Vito Tanzi;

You are known in the literature for the Tanzi Effect. What’s the secret for getting one’s name attached to an economic phenomenon?

The Tanzi Effect was actually described in two of my papers—the first which described the impact of inflation on revenue, and another which extrapolated this effect to the problem it creates when inflation is intentionally implemented to provide resources for investment. However, getting one’s name on a concept is by no means a guarantee! Take, for example, the Laffer curve. Laffer became very famous for his idea that when tax rates are pushed above a certain level, revenue comes down. But I can point you to books written in the 1850s by Italian economists, who present his exact ideas, but in one clear paragraph! Similarly, there was an equation which appeared in a paper that I wrote in 1980 for the American Economic Review. The paper was edited by John Taylor, who later wrote a paper, which established the Taylor Rule, using this equation (which to be fair was not formulated exactly the same way I had written it). So, it’s a bit of a haphazard affair. I’m sorry, but I do not know the secret either! By the way, I had no role in naming the Tanzi effect, and would like to thank the first person who did!

Book Recommendations for Public Finance Practitioners

Chipping Away at Public Debt—Sources of Failure and Keys to Success in Fiscal Adjustment

Economic Policy-Theory and Practice Agnès Bénassy-Quéré, Benoît Coeuré, Pierre Jacquet and Jean Pisani-Ferry
Government versus Markets
The Changing Economic Role of the StateVito Tanzi

Free Read on Behavioral Public Economics

Policy and Choice -Public Finance through the Lens of Behavioral Economics
William J. Congdon, Jeffrey R. Kling and Sendhil Mullainathan, Brookings Institution Press

Crazy Book Pricing- Decline to Fall: The Making of British Macro-economic Policy

Decline to Fall: The Making of British Macro-economic Policy and the 1976 IMF Crisis-Douglas Wass

Kindle edition costs USD 80
Hardcover on Amazon- USD 125

Related:
A review of the book from F&D;

In the subsequent discussions between U.K. and IMF officials, the main issues were fiscal adjustment and the exchange rate. Particularly on fiscal adjustment, according to Wass, it became clear in the technical discussions that "there could be no meeting of minds on the logic," because the British officials viewed the IMF's financial programming approach as inapplicable to their economy. The officials were skeptical about the basis for targets for monetary growth, and about the assumed links between the fiscal balance and domestic credit expansion in an economy with an advanced financial system. However, the IMF had more of a meeting of minds with Chancellor Denis Healey, who agreed that monetary expansion on existing fiscal policies was likely to fuel inflation, although he disputed the scale of the adjustment that the IMF sought. Differences were eventually narrowed, partly by the IMF's agreeing to the authorities' commitment to fiscal measures to be taken only if growth in the second year of the program exceeded a certain rate.

Assorted

Can a Soda Tax Save Us From Ourselves?

Pelé Remains the Last Word in a Changed World

How to commit the perfect crime

Impact Assessment Meets the Market

"Identity Economics" by George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton: A Rambling Review

High Stakes Innovation

Antibiotic Resistance, A Risk We Don't Worry About Enough

Anchoring

Podcasts
Menand on Psychiatry

We Don't Know How To Solve Global Poverty And That's A Good Thing
Speaker: Professor William Easterly.

Financial Crises And Crisis Economics: Past, Present And Future
Speaker: Professor Nouriel Roubini.

How Much Does Good Management Matter? Evidence From India
Speaker: Professor John Roberts.

The Plundered Planet
Speaker: Professor Paul Collier.

Building Social Business: The New Kind Of Capitalism That Serves Humanity's Most Pressing Needs
Speaker: Professor Muhammad Yunus

The Career-Family Conundrum
Speaker: Professor Claudia Goldin.

India's Economy: Performance And Challenges
Speaker: Shankar Acharya, Isher Ahluwalia, Montek Singh Ahluwalia, Surjit Bhalla, Martin Wolf.